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Many QKD analyses examine the link security in a subset of the full Hilbert space that is available to
describe the system. In reality, information about the photon state can be embedded in correlations between
the polarization space and other dimensions of the full Hilbert space in such a way that Eve can determine
the polarization of a photon without affecting it. This paper uses the concept of suitability [1] to quantify the
available information for Eve to exploit, and and demonstrate how it is possible for Alice and Bob to fool
themselves into thinking they have a highly secure link.
I. INTRODUCTION
The earliest treatment of QKD [2] was a theoretical paper that defined a method for distant parties (Alice and
Bob) to agree on a random sequence of key bits through the information encoded and transferred between the them.
This approach relies on polarization encoding of photons and is now well known as the BB84 protocol. Since then,
experimenters have used faint laser sources to demonstrate key exchanges via polarization bases[3] [4] [5], phase
encoded qubits [6] [7] [8] [9], and frequency encoded qubits [10] [11] [12]. Another important trend has been the use
of entangled photon pairs for quantum cryptography. Thus far, experiments exploiting the polarization entangled
photons [13] [14] as well as implementations taking advantage of energy-time entangled photons [15] [16] [17] have been
reported. Although the implementation of entanglement experiments tends to be more complex than implementations
using faint laser sources, it is generally believed [18] that entangled photon pairs are more desirable because they
prevent unintended use of the extra degrees of freedom in the photon number state. The truth is that the equipment
used to build the experiments is not perfect, so that the advantage of one systems approach over another changes
depending on ones choice of implementation hardware. In other words, under some conditions (e.g. a measurement
setup with an extremely low quantum efficiency detector) the faint photon source might have a significant advantage
over the SPDC down conversion source, while a different set of conditions and hardware might yield a significant
advantage to the system with the SPDC source. Indeed, many of the early analyses of proposed QKD systems
assumed perfect detectors, sources, beam splitters, and other apparatus, and failed to take into account real world
imperfections. However, as the field matured, imperfections in sources and detectors began to drive the architectures
[19] [20]. Now the introduction of the suitability parameter gives a systematic set of ground rules for comparing
both different hardware implementations of a single approach as well as completely different approaches. This paper
takes the suitability concept defined in Hockney et. al. [1] and applies it to the quantum key distribution (QKD)
application. In that paper, the basic concept of suitability was introduced as a means of helping one compare the
usefulness of individual hardware devices (e.g. detectors, sources, etc.) for quantum computing applications.
After showing how losses in the channel adversely affect the security of the exchange link in the expected fashion,
this paper then uses the suitability to examine how parameters other than the number state and the polarization
state can impact the security of quantum key distribution. The general definition of the suitability, SGT , describes,
on a scale from 0 to 1, how well a given source gun, G, and a given target system, T, will work together. The
suitability calculation is always performed using the requirements of a specific application context. For example,
the QKD application has two classes of users (i) those who need to share a secret (Alice, Bob, and their associates)
and (ii) those who wish to surreptitiously discover shared secrets (Eve and her associates). For Alice and Bob, the
target T is the apparatus used to extract polarization information. In addition, Alice and Bob need to compute the
suitability for the worst case of information leakage to Eve. That is, they assume that any photons which they cannot
account for have been captured and ”read” by Eve. In the example discussed in this paper, the suitability factor
clearly shows how efficiently information carried by the photon is distributed from Alice to Bob and how effectively
the information shared by Alice and Bob can be kept from Eve. Furthermore, though Alice and Bob only need to work
in the polarization subset of the full Hilbert space to establish a shared key when using the BB84 protocol, it becomes
2very clear that they must work in the full Hilbert space to properly evaluate the security of their key exchange system.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II defines the suitability factor for the polarization-only Hilbert
space. Section III discusses how Eve can improve her opportunity to cheat, Section IV discusses the need for treating
the full Hilbert space to minimize Eve’s cheating opportunities, and Section V draws conclusions from what we have
learned in this treatment.
II. POLARIZATION HILBERT SPACE
This section reviews concepts that were introduced in reference [1]. In this discussion, a measurement system will
consist of the following components: a source, a transmission channel, one or more analyzers, and a detector. The
arrangement of these components is determined by the specific objectives of the parties involved in the measurement.
The suitability is defined quantum mechanically in terms of the density matrix,
ρT =
1
NT
∑
i=1
|Ψi〉〈Ψi| (1)
for the NT possible target states suitable for detection by the detector; and the gun density matrix, ρG, the
probability distribution of all possible output states that the source gun can produce. These are then used to
calculate the suitability, which is the probability that the output of the source gun will be usable by the detector.
For example, if the source is a pure state and the target is a pure state, SGT reduces to the wave function overlap
between the source and the detector states.
SGT =
FGT
FTT
=
Tr(ρGT )
Tr(ρTT )
, (2)
where the quantity, Fij = Tr(ρiρj) for any two normalized density matrices, ρi and ρj . Note that the density
matrix of a pure state satisfies the condition Tr(ρ2) = 1, which is physically interpreted as the probability that two
consecutive shots from the gun are the same state. Whereas the purpose of defining the suitability in reference [1] was
to permit one to rank the usefulness of the individual devices that are being developed by researchers for quantum
computing applications, this paper shows how it can be applied to the comparison of different physical implementations
of integrated hardware systems. Prior results have always been based on ad hoc probability calculations that define
an idealized measurement space which is usually a subset of the real physical measurement space. Let us take the
example of a QKD network consisting of two nodes belonging to Alice and Bob, who have chosen to implement
a simple two-state variation of the BB84 protocol [2]. Because Alice and Bob have agreed on the system design
beforehand, they know the protocol and everything about their own measurement system, so it is easy for them to
calculate the suitability of their setup for key construction. In this example the channel is assumed to be lossless, and
the detectors quantum efficiency is assumed to be ηB = 1. This specifically does not depend on the entire Hilbert
space, but only on the sub-space involving polarization in a well defined time slot. If one constructs a truth table of
all combinations of Alice’s and Bobs polarization settings, there are four possible measurement configurations. The
suitability can be used to determine the probability that the detector will fire for each configuration.
This is obtained by starting with the density matrix of the gun-state, ρG, during the time slot, t0, allowing any
changes induced by passage through the channel to act upon the gun-state density matrix, and then taking the product
of the target-state density matrix, ρT , in the associated timeslot, t0 + LAB/c. Note that since Bobs polarizer in each
configuration defines only one target-state, NT = 1 in equation 1. Here LAB is defined as the length of the fiber
separating Alices source from Bobs detector and c is the speed of light. Assuming that there are no loss mechanisms
between the two nodes, Bobs detector will fire as long as one of the detection states, |Ψi〉, overlaps with the guns
single-photon state. In this system, the combined orientations of Alices polarization rotator and Bobs polarization
analyzer define the relevant information encoded in the channel and the suitability is calculated by following three
simple rules:
• Conditions imposed by Alices preparation are incorporated into the gun density matrix, ρG.
• Conditions imposed by Bobs analyzer measurements are incorporated into the target density matrix, ρT .
• Channel losses are incorporated into the source state density matrix, ρG.
The density matrices for Alices polarization states are derived from equation [1] using the following definitions for
3Alices source states
|Π0〉A = |H〉
and
|Π1〉A = (|H〉 − |V 〉)/
√
2,
. Therefore the gun density matrices are:
ρA,0 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
; ρA,1 =
1
2
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
, (3)
while Bobs analyzer, which defines the target states
|Π0〉B = (|H〉+ |V 〉)/
√
2
and
|Π1〉B = |V 〉,
yields the target density matrices:
ρB,0 =
1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
; ρB,1 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
. (4)
In a lossless system with perfect detectors, the suitability for key construction is
SABij = FABij = Tr(ρA,iρB,j) =
1
2
δij , (5)
The factor of 1/2, which explicitly reflects the probability that Bob receives a usable photon, is exactly what one
expects when both he and Alice select the same bit-value (i.e. i = j), ; Bob will gain a bit of shared key half of the
time. It tells one how efficiently information is transferred via the projective measurements between Alice and Bob.
III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EVE
We can also rate on a scale from 0 to 1, the suitability of Alice’s source for the eavesdropper, Eve. The classical
treatment of QKD security depends on the non-clonability feature of qubits. But within the classic QKD scenario,
there is an implicit assumption that the polarization Hilbert space uniquely describes everything one needs to know
about the key distribution system. The traditional treatments of QKD security tend to focus on the ability of an
eaves-dropper to carry out undetected polarization measurements and assumes that the polarization state is the
only way that the photon carries its encoded information. More specifically, it assumes that any variation of the
measurement apparatus that Eve can bring to bear in order to extract information about the photon is limited to
manipulations or measurements within the polarization Hilbert space. In fact, the real Hilbert space is much larger,
including descriptions of timing, frequency, phase, and number state for the photon. This means that Eve can take
advantage of the larger Hilbert space and cheat, especially if the information encoded wave functions do not overlap in
the parts of the Hilbert space that are not part of Alice and Bob’s protocol definitions. In the discussion that follows,
we first consider what happens in the ordinary polarization encoding case, and then we add in the other dimensions
of Hilbert space to show how it opens up opportunities that Eve can exploit to her advantage.
The problem from Bob’s and Alices perspectives is that they really don’t know what protocol Eve will chose in
trying to recover information on the key; remember that Eve is allowed to do anything. Thus if Bob and Alice try to
calculate Eve’s suitability, they must focus on defining the maximum amount of information that Eve could extract
from the channel (without changing the photon statistics for their measurements).
The cloud in Figure 1 represents Bob’s and Alices uncertainty in terms of Eves protocol and measurement meth-
ods. The conservative approach for Alice and Bob would be to assume that the cloud has ideal properties for the
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FIG. 1: Schematic of projective measurement setup between Alice and Bob for the purpose of agreeing on a secret key. The
”cloud” around Eve represent unknowns in the measurement that might allow Eve to extract information about the key.
eavesdropper in that it (1) passes all single photons to Bob that are emitted from Alices photon gun, and (2) when
more than one photon is incident during the same time slot, the cloud diverts the extra photons to Eve with with
100% probability. Thus in the situation where one has a true single-photon source, ρE,I = 0, because no photons are
diverted to Eve; hence the suitability for Eve to recover the key sequence is given by
SAEij = FAEij = Tr(ρA,iρE,j) = 0.
When Alice has an imperfect source, such as the attenuated pulsed lasers actually used in QKD experiments, the
wave function for the pseudo-single photon sources spans a larger Hilbert space, which must be taken into account.
These are best represented as weak coherent states of the radiation field. This means that to be completely correct,
the initial wavefunction must describe both the polarization state of the photon and the number state.
|ψi〉 =
∑
n
cni|n〉|Πi〉. (6)
For example, a weak source would have
cni = e
−|α|2
2
αn√
n!
The sum over n is over the full Hilbert space of number states, |Πi〉 represents the polarization states, the sum over i is
the sum over the polarization Hilbert space, and α is the expectation value of the number operator. The new density
matrix for this source after interaction with the environment of the channel (i.e. Alices rotation, Bobs analyzer, and
any losses incurred in the channel) is:
SABij = FABij = Tr([e
−|α|2
∞∑
m=0
α2m
m!
||m〉〈m|]ρA,i[e−|α|
2
∞∑
n=1
α2n
n!
|n〉〈n|]ρB,j). (7)
Gisin, et. al. [21] summarize the body of literature that explores how much information Eve can potentially exploit
in the presence of more than one photon in the channel. With a heavily attenuated source, (which produces the
vacuum state, |0〉, on average, occasionally a single-photon, |1〉, and more rarely multiple photons, |n〉, for n ≥ 2)
Bobs suitability to detect the generated key is reduced by the probability that zero photons are generated in a given
time slot. That is, as long as one or more photons are created by Alice, Bob has a finite probability of being able to
observe the photon. In addition, with such a source, things also become very interesting for Eve because every now
and then, n ≥ 2 so that Eves suitability takes on finite values. Now Bob and Eves respective suitabilities for any
given outcome are:
SABij = FABij = Tr([e
−|α|2
∞∑
m=0
α2m
m!
|m〉〈m|]ρA,i[e−|α|
2
∞∑
n=1
α2n
n!
|n〉〈n|]ρB,j) (8)
=
(1− e−|α|2)δij
2
. (9)
SAEij = FAEij = Tr([e
−|α|2
∞∑
m=0
α2m
m!
||m〉〈m|]ρA,i[e−|α|
2
∞∑
n=2
α2n
n!
|n〉〈n|]ρE,j) (10)
=
(1− e−|α|2 − α2e−|α|2)δij
2
. (11)
5Because SAB is defined only for those states where n ≥ 1, Tr(ρA) = 1. Likewise, SAE is defined only for those states
when n ≥ 2, hence Tr(ρE) = 1. Assuming that Eve is performing the same measurements as Bob in her attempts to
extract a key, the ratio of the sum of all Eve’s measurement configurations to Bob’s measurement configurations is
SAE
SAB
=
∑
ij SAEij∑
i′j′ SABi′j′
= Γ, (12)
which determines the percentage of the time that Eve extracts information on the exchanged key bits with her
measurements. Here Γ = (1 − e−|α|2 − α2e−|α|2)/(1 − e−|α|2). For a coherent source in the single photon limit,
e−|α|
2 ≃ 1− |α|2
SAE
SAB
= Γ ≃ |α|2 (13)
Notice that Eves suitability has thus far always been calculated from the perspective of what Alice and Bob know
about Eve. If Eve were to calculate the suitability herself the outcome would be completely different because she
knows everything about the limitations of her own measurement setup and hence can calculate her suitability more
exactly than Bob and Alice can. Furthermore, the emphasis of her suitability calculation differs because what she
really wants to know is how to the maximize the probability of recovering key information while minimizing the
chances that either Alice or Bob detect her presence on the channel. Since there are some aspects of Alice’s and
Bobs measurement system of which Eve is unaware, her uncertainty about these details will be reflected as a larger
uncertainty in Eves confidence that Alice and Bob have not detected her presence on the channel.
IV. FULL HILBERT SPACE
However, the full Hilbert space of the channel is much larger. It contains timing information and, if it is not in
a single mode fiber, mode information. In this section we expand the wave function to include the other degrees
of freedom in the photon state that are not intentionally encoded as part of the key exchange protocol. The model
thus far has concentrated on the polarization subspace and the number states defined by the coherent states of the
radiation field. However, the Hilbert space that can be exploited for encoding information onto a single photon is still
larger than the one defined by the polarization basis and the number states. Other properties which are exploitable
by Eve are the photon arrival time (which changes its position in the time slot), the photon wave number, and the
photon energy[15]. Hence the full wavefunction is of the form:
|Ψi(ti)〉 = {
∫
t
∫
~k
∞∑
n
cni(ti, ~k)|n〉|Ω(t− ti)〉|K(~k)〉dtd~k}|Πi〉, (14)
where |Ω(t− ti)〉 is the wavefunction describing the photons temporal behavior at time t, and |K(~k)〉 is the normal-
ized wavefunction for the photon wave vectors. For example, recent findings that single photons carry orbital angular
momentum [23], imply that |Πi〉 should include both the spin angular momentum due to polarization and the orbital
angular momentum associated with the momentum vector. Together, they would both span a larger Hilbert space
than the i = 2 due to the polarization states alone.
Because of these other dimensions Eve can potentially extract key information without performing a direct polar-
ization analysis on the photon. In the example given above, Alice and Bob only perform projective measurements on
the polarization state because that is all they need to know to complete their key exchange. Thus their suitability
for completing the key exchange is unchanged from equation 10, despite the more complex wavefunction. On the
other hand, suppose that Alice’s source had some inadvertent, but measurable bias built into the photon time of
arrival (as shown in Figure 2) and that this timing bias was a direct function of the selected polarization state. (This
could happen since birefringence in the half wave plates used for polarization rotation clearly modify the temporal
behavior of the wave packets by retarding one polarization more than the other.) If, in the temporal Hilbert space, the
polarization states are distinguishable and if Eve has modified her detection apparatus to measure the arrival time of
the photon in fine enough time increments, she can infer information about the polarization state. Furthermore, the
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FIG. 2: By chosing to make measurements in a different Hilbert space from the one used by Alice and Bob for the key exchange,
Eve may be able to extract some or all of the key if Alice and Bob are sloppy in setting up their projective measurement hardware.
use of a high bandwidth quantum non-demolition [24] apparatus would enable her to infer this information without
directly detecting the photon. With such a detector, Eves suitability is based on the extent to which the wavefunctions
for the different polarization states are distinguishable during Eves measurements. Eve measures
I(t) = ||Ψi(t− ti)〉+ |Ψj(t− tj)〉‖2, (15)
which will have an interference term when the polarization states are completely indistinguishable in time domain
measurements if |ti − tj| = 0. Defining ∆T as the temporal size of the wavefunction, and δT as the temporal
resolution of Eve’s measurement apparatus, one also sees that the polarization states are completely distinguishable
in the time domain when |ti− tj | >> ∆T and ∆T > δT . Notice that in all or our earlier treatments, the information,
conveyed by the polarization state, was extracted via a projective measurement into a specific state. However, in the
temporal domain, Eve can setup to measure everything that comes her way by sorting them into time bins. The only
requirement is that her temporal measurement resolution must be smaller than the time separation between the two
states. As a consequence, the best test for determining distinguishability is to look for evidence of the interference
cross terms.
To check the suitability for Eve, Alice and Bob must calculate the extent to which the two different polarization
states are indistinguishable in the other dimensions of the full Hilbert space. Clearly, if Eves measurement instruments
can resolve the non-overlapping wavefunctions of the different photon states in the time or in the frequency subspaces,
Eve would be able to extract more information from the channel than Bob could with his polarization analyzers. It
thus behooves Eve to design and build an apparatus which is capable of resolving the non-overlap portions of the
wave function in a dimension orthogonal to the one chosen for the key exchange protocol. If Eve is successful in the
temporal domain, the respective suitabilities are
SABij =
(1− e−|α|2)δij
2
. (16)
SAEij = FAEij = Tr(ρA,i[1−
1
NT
{|Ψi(ti)〉〈Ψj(tj)|+ |Ψj(tj)〉〈Ψi(ti)|}]) (17)
=
1
2
δij [1− 1
NT
{|Ψi(ti)〉〈Ψj(tj)|+ |Ψj(tj)〉〈Ψi(ti)|}]. (18)
where Ψ(ti) and Ψ(ti) denote the temporal evolution of the encoded source states. But Eve is not limited to the
temporal Hilbert space. She can also devise hardware to distinguish other properties of the photon such as frequency,
momentum vector, etc. such that the percentage of Bob’s bits that Eve recovers is
SAE
SAB
=
∑
ij SAEij∑
i′j′ SABi′j′
=
[1− 1
NT
{|Ψi(ti, ~ki)〉〈Ψj(tj , ~kj)|+ |Ψj(tj , ~kj)〉〈Ψi(ti, ~ki)|}]
(1− e−|α|2) . (19)
Here, NT = 2 because Alice and Bob encoded a total of two different target states. This calculation is based on
Alice and Bob’s understanding of what information Eve could capture when the wave functions of their encoded states
have imperfect overlap. To state it more generally, the overlap of the wavefunctions for Alices two polarization states
determine how much information Eve can extract from the channel through measurements in a subspaces orthogonal
to the polarization subspace which was selected for encoding the key. If the overlap is perfect, there is sufficient
ambiguity about the photon state that Eve gets no information, but if there is absolutely no overlap between the two
wavefunctions and Eve can resolve it; then Eve gets practically everything. This means that Eve knows exactly which
of her measurements in the orthogonal subspace corresponds to Alices 0-bit and 1-bit polarization values, which means
there is no security for the key exchange because Eve’s measurements allow her to read out the polarization encoding
imparted to each photon. Furthermore, when Eve’s suitability for eavesdropping is greater than or equal to Alice’s
and Bobs suitability for key construction, the privacy amplification protocol developed by Bennett et. al. [25] breaks
7down. In essence, more bits must be removed to insure security than exist in the exchanged key. Consequently, it is
critical for Alice and Bob to include in the secrecy analysis of their exchange protocol, all of the Hilbert subspaces
beyond the one in which the qubit information is intentionally encoded. The analysis is performed in these other
subspaces in order to define the criteria for closing potential information extraction loopholes that Eve could exploit.
The loopholes are closed by imposing additional performance specifications on the measurable effects of the source,
analyzers, transmission medium, etc. on the qubit wavefunction for these additional subspaces.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Suitability provides a systematic method of determining both the key exchange efficiency of networks and the
unintentional weakness in a specific hardware implementation of networks to eavesdropping. In determining the
security of a key exchange channel, we have found that it is important to make a mathematical model that includes
all of the physical variables of the system. Writing down the entire wavefunction that spans the full Hilbert space
would allow one to quickly identify alternative measurements that Eve might exploit to extract information about
the exchanged key. As shown here, systematic application of suitability criterion over the full measurement Hilbert
space, when designing key exchange networks should help improve the security of the final product. If we assume that
Eve can only access the channel, there is still the question of whether Alice’s description of the channel is complete.
However, even if Equation 14 does not quite span the full Hilbert space of the channel, one sees from Equation 19
that it is possible to verify that the wavefunctions have good overlap across the full Hilbert space if one observes,
through measurement, that the interference terms are present. The Hong, Ou, Mandel experiment [26] both describes
and demonstrates a prototype setup for determining wavefunction overlap across the full Hilbert space.
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